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 CRIMINAL CORRUPTION:  
WHY BROAD DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY MAKE THINGS WORSE  
 
Albert W. Alschuler* 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Although the law of bribery may look profoundly under-inclusive, the push to 
expand it usually should be resisted. This article traces the history of two competing 
concepts of bribery—the “intent to influence” concept (a concept initially applied only 
to gifts given to judges) and the “illegal contract” concept. It argues that, if taken 
literally and applied to officials other than judges, “intent to influence” is now an 
unthinkable standard. The article defends the Supreme Court’s refusal to treat 
campaign contributions as bribes in the absence of an “explicit” quid pro quo and its 
refusal to read a statute criminalizing deprivations of “the intangible right of honest 
services” as scuttling the quid pro quo requirement. While recognizing that the “stream 
of benefits” metaphor can be compatible with this requirement, it cautions against 
allowing the requirement to degenerate into a “one hand washes the other” or 
“favoritism” standard. The article maintains that specific, ex ante regulations of the 
sort commonly found in ethical codes and campaign finance regulations provide a 
better way to limit corruption than bribery laws, but it warns that even these 
regulations should not prohibit all practices that may be the functional equivalent of 
bribery. The article concludes by speculating about whether the efforts of federal 
prosecutors to reduce corruption over the past 60 years have given us better 
government.  
 
I. THE CORRUPTION DILEMMA 
 
The scholarship of Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig has reminded 
us of the classic definition of corruption.1 Corruption in its classic sense 
describes something that has become impure or perverted.2 In Aristotle’s 
words, “The true forms of government . . . are those in which [rulers] 
                                                 
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the University 
of Chicago.  
1 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S 
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 9, 38, 39, 41 (2014); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-
Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, 
LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 15-20, 230-47 (2011); 
Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014); “Corruption,” originally, http://ocorruption.tumblr.com (undated: 
“a blog collecting every use of the term ‘corruption’ among the records of the Framers. 
Submitted to the Supreme Court as an appendix to an amicus brief by Lawrence Lessig for 
the Constitutional Accountability Center”).  
2 See Richard Mulgan, Aristotle on Legality and Corruption, in CORRUPTION: 
EXPANDING THE FOCUS 25 (Manuhuia Barcham, Barry Hindess, and Peter Lamour, eds., 
2012). 
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govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule 
with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions.”3 New York Times 
columnist Bob Herbert explains why our government fits the ancient 
definition:  
 
The corporate and financial elites threw astounding sums of 
money into campaign contributions and high-priced 
lobbyists and think tanks and media buys and anything else 
they could think of. They wined and dined powerful leaders 
of both parties. They flew them on private jets and wooed 
them with golf outings and lavish vacations and gave them 
high-paying jobs as lobbyists the moment they left the 
government. All that money was well spent. The 
investments paid off big time.4 
In at least one sense, the practices Herbert decries are the functional 
equivalent of bribery.5 Quid pro quo bribes produce decisions not in the 
public interest—they corrupt—and unconditional contributions and gifts do 
too.  
Declaring that implicit agreements and understandings lie behind these 
practices, however, would be too cynical. The problem is not that corrupt 
agreements are left to winks and nods. Instead, with rare exceptions, there 
are no agreements, express or implied. Campaign contributions and other 
benefits are accompanied by hope but not by an understanding that a 
recipient will provide anything in return. As Herbert says, the hope may 
turn out to be justified often enough to make the contributions good 
investments. Quid pro quo exchanges are rarely how corruption happens. If 
a public official were to do nothing to aid one of his benefactors, the 
benefactor usually would not say even to himself that the official had 
                                                 
3 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 59 (Benjamin Jowett, tr.) (Forgotten Books ed. 2007).   
4 Bob Herbert, When Democracy Weakens, NY TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A21. 
5 Many people, including former president Jimmy Carter, former governor Jesse 
Ventura, and former lobbyist and prisoner Jack Abramoff, have described our campaign 
finance system as one of legalized bribery. See Ray Henry, Jimmy Carter: Unchecked 
Political Contributions Are “Legal Bribery”, HUFFINGTON POST, July 17, 2013, 
http://www.huffintonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmy-carter-bribery_n_3611882.html; Bruno J. 
Navarro, Jesse Ventura Likens Politics to Bribery, CNBC, June 19, 2012, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47883494; LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting 
Jack Abramoff: “I was participating in a system of legalized bribery. All of it is bribery, 
every bit of it.”); Thomas L. Friedman, Calling America: Hello? Hello? Hello? Hello?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at SR11 (“[O]ur Congress has become a forum for legalized 
bribery”); Editorial: The Line at the “Super PAC” Trough, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2014, at 
SR 10 (“This election year will be the moment when individual candidate super PACs—a 
form of legalized bribery—will become a truly toxic force in American politics.”).  
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broken an implicit promise.  
When the goal is to root out Aristotelian corruption, the law of bribery, 
extortion, and fraud looks profoundly under-inclusive. The push of 
prosecutors, judges, journalists, and reformers to expand this law is easily 
understood. The thesis of this article, however, is that the push usually 
should be resisted. America can better achieve James Madison’s “wish that 
the national legislature be as uncorrupt as possible”6 through specific, ex 
ante regulations—what Zephyr Teachout calls structural or prophylactic 
rules.7 These regulations include, in particular, campaign-finance 
limitations of the sort today’s Supreme Court strikes down, gratuity 
prohibitions, and ethical codes forbidding the creation of some conflicts of 
interest. Trying to block all functional equivalents of bribery even through 
specific, ex ante regulations, however, would do more harm than good.    
 
II. TWO DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY 
 
A.  “Intent to Influence” Bribery 
 
1. The Basic Standard 
 
On first reading, federal bribery statutes appear to make felons of 
everyone who supplies the kind of benefits Bob Herbert describes. So do 
the bribery statutes of nearly one-third of the states. These statutes forbid 
giving, offering or promising anything of value to an official with intent to 
influence an official act. Some of them, including the two principal federal 
bribery statutes, add the word “corruptly”; they forbid “corruptly” offering a 
benefit with intent to influence.8 Other statutes, however, leave this word 
out,9 and federal bribery statutes did not include it until 1962.10 At least 
with the adverb set aside, “intent to influence” statutes appear to make a 
criminal of every lobbyist who buys lunch for a legislator and of every 
campaign contributor who hopes that his contribution will make its 
recipient more sympathetic to his interests.  
The “intent to influence” statutes took their standard from the English 
                                                 
6 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 261 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1902) (The Journal 
of the Constitutional Convention).   
7 See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 4, 284-87. 
8 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (federal program bribery); 
Fla. Stat. § 838.015 (2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-210 (2013).  
9 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-11-11 (App. 113a) (2014); La. R.S. § 14:118 (2013); 
Wis. Stat. § 946.10 (2014).     
10 See, e.g., An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Penal Laws of the United States 
§§ 111-12, 117, 35 Stat. 1088, 1108-09, 1109-10 (1909). 
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common law.11 Both this law and the earliest bribery statutes, however, 
applied it only to benefits provided to judges.12 Congress enacted its first 
general prohibition of bribery in 1853—a time when Aristotelian ideals of 
impartiality and public service were taken so seriously that paid lobbying 
was considered contrary to public policy and sometimes made a crime.13 
Borrowing language that once had applied only to the corruption of 
judges,14 the 1853 statute forbade both “bribes” and “presents” when they 
were given “with intent to influence” federal officials.15 Congress no doubt 
meant these words just the way they sound. 
Some courts still take the words “intent to influence” literally. The Fifth 
Circuit, for example, denied a defendant’s request for an instruction that 
Louisiana’s “intent to influence” statute did not forbid “gifts made for 
customary business reasons.” Giving such an instruction, the court said, 
“would be a rank misapplication of the Louisiana bribery law. Customary 
business practices could embrace all sorts of extravagant favors intended to 
influence important business decisions.”16  
 
2. The Adverb 
 
The Louisiana bribery statute construed by the Fifth Circuit did not 
include the word “corruptly,” and perhaps the court would have reached a 
different result if it had. A statute that forbids corruptly giving a benefit 
with intent to influence seems to acknowledge that not all benefits given 
with intent to influence are improper. Perhaps the word “corruptly” is 
                                                 
11 See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 118. 
12 See id. at 103-04, 111; Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (a bribery 
statute applicable only to judges). By 1798, a federal statute forbade bribing a federal 
“Judge, an Officer of the Customs, or an Officer of the Excise.” Whether federal courts 
could convict people not covered by this statute of common law bribery was disputed. See 
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384, 390 (C.C. Pa. 1798). In England, when officials other 
than judges took bribes, the common law could convict them of extortion. A bribe giver, 
however, could not be convicted of this crime. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction 
Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV 815 (1988). 
13 See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 144-73. At least one 
court also held that political logrolling could be prosecuted as a common law misdemeanor. 
The court said that logrolling violated an official’s duty “to vote in reference only to the 
merits.” Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 4 Va. 460, 463 (1825).   
14 The first federal bribery statute forbade giving any money “or any other bribe, 
present or reward . . . to obtain or procure the opinion, judgment or decree of any judge or 
judges of the United States.” Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117. 
15 Act of Feb. 26, 1853, Ch. 81 § 6, 10 Stat. 171.  
16 United States v. L’Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 808 (5th Cir. 1980). A federal prosecutor 
could charge a violation of the Louisiana statute because bribery in violation of state law is 
a RICO predicate. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).   
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crucial, and perhaps it does most of the work. This fudgy adverb might 
prevent “intent to influence” statutes from sweeping into their net the 
lobbyist’s lunch, other routine entertainment, and many campaign 
contributions.  
When a federal statute uses a word that had an established meaning at 
common law, courts presume that Congress meant the word to retain this 
meaning.17 Common law extortion (which included accepting but not giving 
bribes18) required a “corrupt” intent. The English courts, however, did not 
use the word in the same way Aristotle (or his translators and interpreters) 
did.  
From the thirteenth through the late eighteenth centuries, officials in 
England were entitled to collect statutory dues and customary fees for 
services, and the line between legitimate fee collection and extortion was 
sometimes murky. The courts declared that officials acted corruptly only 
when they realized they were not entitled to the fees they collected. 
“Corruptly” meant deliberately acting in violation of positive law or 
established norms of legitimate official conduct.19  
Judge Kozinski’s reading of the word “corruptly” in a federal bribery 
statute echoed the common law. In a dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit, 
he wrote, “Conduct is corrupt if it’s an improper way for a public official to 
benefit from his job. But what’s improper turns on many different factors, 
such as tradition, context and current attitudes about legitimate rewards for 
particular officeholders.”20 Kozinski added that corruption “can’t be easily 
captured in a single formula, as it varies too much from situation to 
situation.”21 
Federal juries never hear an explanation of the word “corruptly” like 
Judge Kozinski’s. Many courts see the word as doing no work at all. They 
have made it redundant by declaring that a person acts corruptly whenever 
his conduct and mental state establish the other elements of bribery. The 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (quoting several earlier 
decisions).  
18 See Lindgren, supra note  , at 821 (“Bribery behavior was routinely punished as 
common law extortion.”). The Supreme Court relied on Lindgren’s scholarship when it 
held that the Hobbs Act, a federal extortion statute, punishes bribery. See Evans v. United 
States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992); id. at 281-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the 
merits of [Lindgren’s] argument as a description of early English common law, it is beside 
the point here—the critical inquiry for our purposes is the American understanding of the 
crime at the time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.”).     
19 See Note (Jeremy N. Gayed), “Corruptly”: Why Corrupt State of Mind is an 
Essential Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2003); Rex v. Vaughn, 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 308 (K.B. 1769) (requiring 
knowledge that the defendant had engaged in an “unjustifiable transaction.”). 
20 United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
21 Id.  
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Second Circuit, for example, appeared to make felons of all lunch-buying 
lobbyists when it approved the following instruction: “[A] person acts 
corruptly . . . when he gives or offers to give something of value intending 
to influence . . . a government agent in connection with his official acts.”22 
The Seventh Circuit held that omitting the word “corruptly” from jury 
instructions altogether was not plain error because “nothing in the 1962 
addition of the word ‘corrupt’ enlarge[d] the meaning of intent as an 
essential element of the offense.”23 
Courts that do not make the word “corruptly” redundant typically define 
it in language that is just as fudgy, open-ended, and evaluative as the term 
itself. They use the words improper, wrongful, evil, and bad. They say that 
corruption refers to an “improper motive or purpose,”24 an “intent to obtain 
an improper advantage for oneself or someone else,”25 a “wrongful or 
dishonest intent,”26 a “bad purpose or evil motive,”27 or a “wrongful design 
to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage.”28 
Even on Judge Kozinski’s interpretation, the word “corruptly” is 
vague.29 “Intent to influence” statutes seem to require normative evaluation 
as well as fact-finding and mind-reading.30 These statutes are relics of a 
                                                 
22 United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1995). 
23 United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d 1248, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States 
v. Isa, 452 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 1971)). But see Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 1542-
45 (11th Cir. 1997) (indicating that the court would have held unconstitutional a Georgia 
statute that prohibits giving campaign contributions with intent to influence if the state 
courts had not read into this statute a requirement that the contribution be given 
“corruptly”).  
24 See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting jury 
instruction).   
25 United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (quoting United 
States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 (D.C. Cir. 990)). 
26 Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 1996). 
27 United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir. 2007).  
28 United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts also say that acting 
corruptly means acting “with the purpose, at least in part, of accomplishing either an 
unlawful end result, or a lawful end result by some unlawful method or means.” See 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL @ 18 U.S.C. § 201. Someone 
must have worked hard to create this ponderous way of saying that the accused must have 
intended to do something unlawful.  
29 In fact, the D.C. Circuit held the word too vague to give fair notice to a defendant 
accused, not of giving a bribe, but of corruptly influencing Congress by lying to a 
Congressional committee. The court observed that many people attempt to influence 
Congress and that they are entitled to more notice of the line between proper and improper 
conduct than the word “corruptly” supplies. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 
384-86 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
30 It is sometimes said that the criminal law cares about an actor’s intention but not his 
motive. It’s enough, for example, that a defendant charged with homicide meant to kill; it 
doesn’t matter why he did it. But “intent to influence” statutes focus on motive. It is not 
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time when crimes were defined far less precisely than they usually are 
today, when juries rather than prosecutors resolved criminal cases, and 
when Americans had extraordinary faith in the ability of juries to determine 
whether defendants deserved punishment.31  
 
3. The Bribe Taker’s Mental State 
 
 “Intent to influence” describes the mental state of someone who gives a 
bribe. Courts and legislatures have used other language to describe the 
mental state of the person who takes it.  
Instructions sometimes tell juries that the alleged bribe-taker’s 
knowledge of the donor’s intent to influence is enough.32 These instructions 
seem to make a bribe-taker of every official who allows a lobbyist to buy 
him lunch. If the official is awake, he surely must realize that the lobbyist 
intends to influence him. The Second Circuit, however, reversed a 
conviction after the trial court had given an instruction of this sort. The 
court quoted the language of the applicable statute, which focused on the 
defendant’s own motives rather than his knowledge of the other guy’s: “[A] 
recipient’s knowledge of a donor’s intent to influence is insufficient to 
support conviction. The recipient must take the proffered thing of value 
‘intending to be influenced.’”33  
In fact, few bribe takers want to be influenced. What a bribe taker wants 
is a bribe, and he may regret that being influenced is the only way to get it. 
“Intending to be influenced” probably means “knowing that one will be 
influenced.”  
                                                                                                                            
sufficient that a defendant deliberately gave a thing of value to a pubic official. Someone 
must figure out why he did it. 
31 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 39, 140-
41 (2011); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury 
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 902-11 (1994).   
32 See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting the trial 
court’s instruction that the receipt of a personal or financial benefit “violates the law only if 
the benefit was received with the public official’s understanding that it was given to 
influence his decision-making”); United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(noting the trial court’s instruction that “[t]he crime is completed when the property or 
personal advantage is accepted by the public employee knowing that it was offered with 
intent that he act favorably to the person offering the property or personal advantage when 
necessary”); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 261 n.4 (1991) (noting an 
instruction that the jury must be “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment . . 
. was made . . . with the expectation that such payment would influence McCormick’s 
official conduct, and with the knowledge on the part of McCormick that they were paid to 
him with that expectation”). 
33 United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 214 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
666(a)(1)(B)). 
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Whether the word “intent” refers to purpose or knowledge, the statutory 
language noted by the Second Circuit seems to validate two implausible 
defenses: (1) “I did not intend to be influenced because I never meant to 
keep my promise.” And (2) “I did not intend to be influenced because I 
already had made up my mind. I simply agreed to do what I would have 
done anyway.”   
The second defense resembles an argument Sir Francis Bacon offered 
when he was tried for bribery in 1621. Bacon, the Lord Chancellor of 
England as well as a path-breaking philosopher and inventor of modern 
science, claimed that he had never allowed any of the bribes allegedly given 
by litigants to influence him. In fact, he said, he often ruled against the 
alleged bribe-giver.34 Although the House of Lords convicted Bacon, he 
might have been more successful if he had been tried under 18 U.S.C. § 
666, an “intent to be influenced” federal bribery statute. 
Certainly U Po Kyin, George Orwell’s fictional Sub-Division 
Magistrate of Kyauktada in Upper Burma, would escape conviction if § 666 
were taken literally. Kyin always took bribes from both sides to ensure that 
he would decide the cases before him on strictly legal grounds.35 Kyin did 
not intend to be influenced, did not know that he would be influenced, and 
was not in fact influenced. His case may indicate, however, that § 666 must 
mean something other than what it says. 
The other major federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), is somewhat 
less troublesome. It says that a public official may not corruptly demand, 
seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept anything of value in 
return for being influenced in the performance of any official act. An 
official who does not mean to keep his promise might nevertheless agree to 
accept a thing of value in return for being influenced. Perhaps this official 
could be convicted under § 201(b) even if he could not be convicted under § 
666. Like an official charged with violating § 666, however, an official 
charged with violating § 201(b) could defend by saying, “I agreed to vote in 
favor of the Widget Subsidies Act in return for cash, but I never agreed to 
be influenced. I had decided to support widget subsidies long before I took 
the money.” 
 
                                                 
34 See PETER ZAGORIN, FRANCIS BACON 22 (1999). Seeking the king’s intervention 
while his case was pending, Bacon wrote James I that he never had a “bribe or reward in 
my eye or thought when I pronounced any sentence or order.” JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
BRIBES 352 (1984). Some modern observers maintain that Bacon was bum-rapped by Sir 
Edward Coke and other political opponents, but Noonan, who provides a full account of his 
case, makes clear that he was not. See id. at 334-65.  
35 GEORGE ORWELL, BURMESE DAYS 7 (1934). 
9 DEFINING BRIBERY  [January 26, 2015] 
 
B.  “Illegal Contract” Bribery 
 
Someone who contributes to an official’s reelection campaign or gives 
his daughter a nice wedding present may hope to curry the official’s favor. 
This conduct may indeed influence the official, and critics may call it the 
functional equivalent of bribery. Few, however, would describe this conduct 
as bribery itself. It certainly is not the sort of behavior that should expose 
someone to imprisonment for 15 or 20 years.36 The Seventh Circuit has 
commented,  “Vague expectations of some future benefit should not be 
sufficient to make a payment a bribe.”37 As the word is most commonly 
used today, “bribery” probably denotes an actual or contemplated exchange 
of something of value for favorable governmental action, not simply a 
unilateral act intended to make favorable governmental action more likely. 
In 1962, a commentary to the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code declared that the code’s definition of bribery would preclude 
“application of the bribery sanction to situations where gifts are given in the 
mere hope of influence.”38 The MPC defines bribery as offering, giving, 
soliciting, or accepting a pecuniary benefit as “consideration” for an official 
act.39 As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said of a Texas bribery 
statute modeled on this provision, the MPC “requir[es] a bilateral 
arrangement—in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as 
consideration for the performance of an official function.”40  
The words “bilateral arrangement” in the Texas court’s formulation 
might be misleading. Like “intent to influence” bribery, “illegal contract” 
bribery can be committed by an individual acting alone. The crime includes 
offers and solicitations, and it also includes transactions in which one party 
merely feigns agreement. An offender, however, must seek a bargain with 
                                                 
36 The maximum penalty for bribery under federal law is 15 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 
201(b). But bribe-taking can also be prosecuted as honest-services fraud, and the maximum 
penalty for this crime is usually is 20 years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; text at notes 
infra.    
37 United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993).  
38 MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 note on status of section (Proposed Official Draft 
1962).  
39 Id. § 240.1(1).   
40 McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
In Garrett v. McCotter, 807 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 482), the Fifth Circuit noted “that the 
Texas Legislature intentionally replaced ‘with intent to influence’ with ‘any benefit in 
consideration for’ in order to avoid application of the bribery sanction to situations where 
gifts are given in mere hope of influence.” Because this “change in language was intended 
to stiffen the requirements for a bribery conviction,” an indictment that described the crime 
as giving a benefit with intent to influence did not charge an offense under Texas law. Id. at 
485.    
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another person.41 How the other person responds does not matter; the statute 
punishes attempted as well as completed exchanges. More than two-thirds 
of the states have followed MPC’s lead and now embrace the “illegal 
contract” concept of bribery.42  
 
C.  The Federal Amalgam 
 
Federal bribery statutes use the words “intent to influence,” but the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of these words has transformed them. With 
a shoehorn and a shove, the Court has fit the “illegal contract” concept of 
bribery into these “intent to influence” statutes. The Court wrote in Sun-
                                                 
41 At least when the alleged bribe consists of something other than a campaign 
contribution, see text at notes infra, the agreement need not be express. In United States v. 
Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984), for example, an official hearing challenges to tax 
assessments accepted payments from lawyers who practiced before him. The payments 
included a $4000 “referral fee” although the official provided no referral, $500 in cash 
passed in a white envelope under the table at a restaurant, and another $1000 passed in the 
men’s room of a private club.  
“Unlike some of [his] predecessors,” the Seventh Circuit reported, the defendant in 
Gorny “did not receive payments based on the outcome of any specific case nor was the 
amount he received based on a percentage reduction of an assessment.” Id. at 599. His 
benefactors, however, “enjoyed an unusually high rate of success in their practice before 
the Board.” One of them won 80% of his cases and another 93% although the average rate 
of success was only 35%. Id. at 600. 
The defendant in Gorny apparently made no promises out loud, and what cases he 
would fix remained unspecified. Everyone understood what the payments were for, 
however, and the defendant provided it by ruling in favor of his benefactors at a high rate. 
A jury easily could have inferred that, at the time he accepted each payment, the defendant 
agreed implicitly to provide a governmental benefit in return. 
Of course the line between currying favor and seeking an implicit agreement is fuzzy. 
One might ask whether the alleged bribe giver could legitimately have felt cheated rather 
than simply disappointed if the alleged bribe taker had never done anything for him. Could 
the donor plausibly have said to the recipient, “We never spelled it out, but we did have an 
understanding”?   
42 See United States v. Biaggi, 674 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing 38 state 
statutes). One state has approved an “illegal contract” definition of bribery for bribe takers 
and an “intent to influence” definition for bribe givers. See MCLS § 750.118 (2014) (part 
of a Michigan criminal code enacted in 1931) (making it a crime to accept a benefit “under 
an agreement, or with an understanding that [the accepting official’s] vote, opinion, or 
judgment shall be given in any particular manner, or on a particular side of any question”); 
MCLS § 750.117 (2014) (making it a crime to corruptly give any valuable thing with the 
purpose of influencing official action). Zephyr Teachout’s statement that “most states have 
not adopted a quid pro quo requirement for any of their bribery laws” seems correct only in 
the sense that most states do not use the Latin words. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN 
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 240. Requiring that a benefit be offered or accepted as 
“consideration” for favorable governmental action is no different from requiring a quid pro 
quo.     
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Diamond Growers v. United States,43 “Bribery requires intent ‘to influence’ 
an official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act . . . . In other words, for 
bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act.”44  
“Intent to influence” and “exchange” are not different words for the 
same thing. Some of the 179 people who “bundled” more than $500,000 
apiece for President Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign45 undoubtedly 
hoped to influence governmental action—perhaps by increasing the 
likelihood of their own appointment as ambassadors.46 One would be 
surprised, however, to learn of any quid pro quo or corrupt understanding at 
the time they gave their support. As courts have recognized, giving 
something with a “generalized hope of ultimate benefit on the part of the 
donor” is not a bribe.47  
The Supreme Court might better have grounded its quid pro quo 
requirement on the word “corruptly.” Norms have changed since Congress 
enacted its first general bribery statute in 1853,48 and many benefits 
intended to influence are not seen as improper today. Before the Supreme 
Court declared that “intent to influence” and “quid pro quo” meant the same 
thing, a few lower courts had in fact found a quid pro quo requirement in 
the word “corruptly.”49 
Under the Supreme Court’s decisions, a quid pro quo usually can be 
                                                 
43 526 U.S. 398 (1999).  
44 Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States, 526 U.S 398, 404-05 (emphasis in the 
original). 
45 See Center for Responsive Politics, Meet the Bundlers Behind the Money, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.opensecrets.org/pres12/img/bundlers.png (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2014). President Obama’s opponent, Governor Romney, did not reveal how many 
people “bundled” more than $500,000 for his campaign. No law required him to do so.   
46 See Max Fisher, This Very Telling Map Shows Which Ambassadors Were Campaign 
Bundlers, WASH POST, Feb. 10, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/10/this-very-telling-map-
shows-which-u-s-ambassadors-were-campaign-bundlers/ (noting that “23 current U.S. 
ambassadors or ambassadorial nominees . . . were also major campaign-donation 
bundlers”).   
47 See United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980). 
48 See text at notes supra.  
49 See United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978) (declaring that the 
term “corrupt intent” incorporates an element of quid pro quo bribery and adding that the 
quid pro quo element “distinguishes the heightened criminal intent requisite under the 
bribery sections of [§ 201] from the simple mens rea required for violation of the gratuity 
sections”); United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1991) (declaring that the 
“corrupt intent” required by § 201 is an intent “to receive some benefit in return for 
payment”); United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts 
equate ‘corrupt intent’ with intent to engage in a relatively specific quid pro quo.”).  
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implied rather than express. In McCormick v. United States,50 however, the 
Court held that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when 
“the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by 
the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”51 Although the 
Eleventh Circuit has concluded (dubiously) that a later Supreme Court 
decision modified McCormick,52 at least six other courts of appeals insist 
that an explicit agreement remains necessary.53  
McCormick did not rest its requirement of an “explicit” quid pro quo on 
the language of the statute.54 The case arose under an extortion statute, the 
Hobbs Act, which federal courts had construed to reach bribe-taking 
although its language simply forbade obtaining property “under color of 
official right.”55 Without parsing this language, the Court emphasized the 
danger of allowing prosecutors and jurors to infer corrupt bargains from the 
conduct of campaign contributors and elected officials. It said that Congress 
would be required to speak clearly if it wished to demand less than an 
explicit agreement:  
 
To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only 
conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law 
but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so 
long as election campaigns are financed by private 
contributions. It would require statutory language more 
specific than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary 
conclusion.56 
 
Although the Supreme Court embraced the “illegal contract” concept of 
                                                 
50 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
51 Id. at 273. The trial court had given an “intent to influence” instruction. The 
Supreme Court reversed because, at least in a case involving campaign contributions, this 
sort of instruction is erroneous.  
52 See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)).   
53 See United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 253-54, 258 (1st Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 
245, 256-61 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 515-19 (6th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kincaid-
Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009). 
54 See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that the statute 
“contains not even a colorable allusion to . . . quid pro quos”). 
55 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(2).  
56 Id. at 272-73. Justice Thomas later observed, “We . . . imposed [the quid pro quo 
requirement] to prevent the Hobbs Act from effecting a radical (and absurd) change in 
American political life.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 286 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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bribery in 1991, pattern jury instructions in most circuits continue to recite 
the language of federal bribery statutes without elaboration. Juries rarely 
hear the words quid pro quo or the words express, implied, or agreement. 
They hear only that bribe givers and bribe takers must intend to influence or 
to be influenced.57 Many defense attorneys are so inept that they fail to 
complain about these instructions. Especially from the perspective of the 
jury box, the federal law of bribery is a muddle.  
 
III. EFFORTS TO BEND, BREAK, OR CIRCUMVENT 
THE QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT 
 
Because federal bribery statutes as construed by the Supreme Court fall 
far short of proscribing every functional equivalent of bribery, prosecutors, 
lower court judges, legislators, and other corruption fighters look for ways 
to stretch or get around them. The Supreme Court sometimes seems to be 
engaged in a tug of war with everyone else.   
 
A.  Honest Services Fraud 
 
Particularly in the 1970s, prosecutors persuaded the lower federal courts 
that the federal mail fraud statute forbade schemes to deprive the public of 
“the intangible right of honest services.” In 1987, however, the Supreme 
Court held that this statute outlawed depriving people of property, not an ill-
defined intangible right of honest services.58  
The Justice Department then complained to Congress that the Court had 
deprived it of an important tool in its battle against corruption. Congress 
responded by enacting a statute that read in full, “For the purposes of this 
chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 114, 117, 
186-87 (2012), available at http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/; PATTERN 
CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 117, 179 (1998), 
available at https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/pjury.pdf; MANUAL OF 
MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
153, 191, 195 (2014), available at 
http://juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/criminal_instructions.htm; ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 121, 189 (2010), available at 
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryIns
truction.pdf. But see U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS at 6.18.201B1 (2004) (requiring the jury to find that the defendant 
acted “corruptly with the intent to influence an official act, that is, to give [a specified thing 
of value] in exchange for an official act”), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Chap%206%20Bribery.pdf.  
58 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
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artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”59  
This statute enabled lower federal court judges, like the priests of 
ancient Delphi, to explicate language ordinary mortals could not 
understand.60 In United States v. Sawyer61 and United States v. 
Woodward,62 for example, the First Circuit upheld the convictions of a 
lobbyist who had lavishly entertained a legislator and of the legislator 
himself. The well-entertained legislator had supported almost all of the 
lobbyist’s agenda. After noting that bribery was an established category of 
honest services fraud, the court announced that it would expand this 
category “from quid pro quo bribery, to include a more generalized pattern 
of gratuities to coax ‘ongoing favorable official action.’”63 It said that juries 
should be instructed that it is lawful for lobbyists to entertain legislators to 
cultivate “business or personal friendship” but felonious for them to do so 
“to cause the recipient to alter her official acts.”64 The court observed that 
the benefits it made criminal “may not be very different, except in degree, 
from routine cultivation of friendship in a lobbying context.”65 
The First Circuit grounded its rulings in Sawyer and Woodward on the 
legislator’s failure to disclose the conflict of interest created by his 
relationship with the lobbyist:  
 
A public official has an affirmative duty to disclose material 
information to the public employer. When an official fails to 
disclose a personal interest in a matter over which she has 
decision-making power, the public is deprived of its right either 
to disinterested decision making itself or, as the case may be, to 
full disclosure as to the official's potential motivation.66 
 
                                                 
59 18 U.S.C. § 1346.  
60 A panel of the Second Circuit held the honest-services statute too vague to give fair 
notice to defendants, United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002), but the en 
banc Second Circuit set this ruling aside. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 
2003). Other courts also rejected vagueness challenges to the statute. See, e.g., United 
States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 558 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 
933, 941 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 776-77 (5th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 370-71 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Frega, 179 
F.3d 793, 803 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1109 n.29 (10th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568 (11th Cir. 1995). Most federal judges 
apparently believed they could figure out what the statute meant.    
61 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996). 
62 149 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998).   
63 Id. at 55 (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 730).   
64 Id. If you wish to guffaw at the court’s purported distinction, be my guest.   
65 Id.  
66 Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724. 
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Punishing undisclosed conflicts of interest may sound like a fine idea, at 
least when the idea goes by fast. A conflicting interest, however, is any 
interest that might divert an official from faithful service to the public. 
When the official’s decision will benefit a member of his family, he has a 
conflict of interest. When his decision will benefit a business partner or 
good friend, he again has a conflict. When his decision will benefit an 
important political supporter, he has a conflict. When his decision will 
benefit a lobbyist who has taken him on golf outings, he once more has a 
conflict. When this official’s action will benefit anyone at all who done any 
favor for which he is grateful, he has a conflict of interest. Conflicts are 
ubiquitous.67  
No official could compile a list of all his conflicts, and if he could, he 
would not know where to post it. How does one go about disclosing a 
conflict of interest to a disembodied public employer? Would a “my 
conflicts” section on the official’s Facebook page be sufficient? When no 
official ever has or ever could disclose every conflict, criminalizing 
undisclosed conflicts looks like a way to enable prosecutors to pick their 
targets.68 
The Supreme Court did not consider the meaning or the constitutionality 
of the honest services statute until 22 years after its enactment. Then, in 
2010, in Skilling v. United States,69 three justices declared in a concurring 
opinion that they would hold the statute unconstitutionally vague,70 and the 
remaining justices acknowledged that the defendant’s “vagueness challenge 
has force.”71 The majority concluded, however, that the statute could be 
saved by confining it to a “solid core” that every lower court had 
recognized.72 “[H]onest-services fraud does not encompass conduct more 
wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks,” the 
                                                 
67 Show me a public official without conflicts of interest, and I will show you an 
official without any social life, work life, family life, religious life, or political life. 
68 Cf. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Berzon, J., concurring) (“The conflict of interest theory, unhinged from an external 
disclosure standard, places too potent a tool in the hands of zealous prosecutors who may 
be guided by their own political motivations . . .  [and who] might also feel political 
pressure to pursue certain state or local officials.”).  
A court or legislature can reduce the reach of a prohibition of undisclosed conflicts by 
requiring that an official’s non-disclosure violate a federal, state, or local reporting 
requirement. This limitation, however, poses problems of its own. See Albert W. Alschuler, 
Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling v. 
United States, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 501, 513-17 (2014).  
69 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
70 See id. at 415 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Kennedy, JJ., concurring). 
71 Id. at 405 (majority opinion). 
72 Id. at 407. 
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Court said.73 “[N]o other misconduct falls within [the statute’s] province.”74 
The Court not only rejected the government’s argument that the statute 
criminalized failing to disclose a conflict of interest but also warned 
Congress that a statute embracing this standard might be held 
unconstitutional.75 
Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, promptly declared that the Supreme Court had “sided with an 
Enron executive convicted of fraud” and “undermined Congressional efforts 
to protect hardworking Americans from powerful interests.”76 In 2012, the 
Senate approved without noticeable opposition a Leahy-sponsored proposal 
to restore 20-year penalties for some undisclosed conflicts of interest.77 The 
House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved this proposal as well,78 
but the majority leader of the House never brought it to a vote.79 Because 
Congress failed to enact the Leahy proposal, the post-Skilling honest 
services statute remains compatible with the Supreme Court’s quid pro quo 
requirement, at least for now. The Supreme Court may be winning the tug 
of war.  
 
B.  “Stream of Benefits” or “Course of Conduct” Bribery 
 
In United States v. Kemp,80 the Third Circuit upheld a jury instruction 
declaring, “[W]here there is a stream of benefits given by a person to favor 
a public official, . . . it need not be shown that any specific benefit was 
given in exchange for a specific official act.”81 In United States v. Kincaid-
Chauncey,82 the Ninth Circuit declared that accepting a “retainer” with “the 
understanding that when the payor comes calling, the government official 
will do whatever is asked” is bribery.83 In United States v. Whitfield,84 the 
                                                 
73 Id. at 411. 
74 Id. at 412. 
75 Id. at 411 n.44. 
76 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, RESTORING KEY TOOLS TO COMBAT FRAUD 
AND CORRUPTION AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S SKILLING DECISION, HEARING BEFORE 
THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY at 1, 111th Cong. (2010).  
77 See Congress Moves on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A20. I criticize Senator 
Leahy’s proposal in Alschuler, supra note .  
78 See CLEAN UP GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2011, H.R. REP. NO. 112-688 (2012), available 
at beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/2572/summary.  
79 See Seung Min Kim, Eric Cantor Under Fire for STOCK Act Tweaks, POLITICO, 
Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72624.html.  
80 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007). 
81 Id. at 281. 
82 556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009). 
83 Id. at 943. 
84 590 F.3d. 325 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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Fifth Circuit said, “[A] particular, specified act need not be identified at the 
time of payment to satisfy the quid pro quo requirement, so long as the 
payor and payee agreed upon a specific type of action to be taken in the 
future.”85 In United States v. Jennings,86 the Fourth Circuit observed, “[T]he 
intended exchange in bribery can be ‘this for these’ or ‘these for these,’ not 
just ‘this for that.’”87 And in United States v. Ganim,88 the Second Circuit 
wrote, “[S]o long as the jury finds that an official accepted gifts in exchange 
for a promise to perform official acts for the giver, it need not find that the 
specific act to be performed was identified at the time of the promise.”89 
These declarations seem inconsistent with two descriptions of bribery 
by the Supreme Court. The Court wrote in Evans v. United States,90 “The 
offense is complete at the time when the public official receives a payment 
in return for his engagement to perform specific official acts.”91 It added in 
Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States92 that, at least under 18 U.S.C. § 
201(b), a bribe must be given “for or because of some particular official 
act.”93 These statements have led bribery defendants to argue that the 
government failed to identify any “particular official act” or “specific 
official act” they agreed to perform. Even if they agreed in general terms do 
something helpful to their benefactors, the “something” remained 
unspecified. 
As best I can tell, these defendants have never been successful.94 For 
them, the Supreme Court’s statements have been a snare and a delusion. In 
bribery as in baseball, there appears to be no good reason why a transaction 
may not include a player to be named later. If a public official named Genie 
were to agree to grant three wishes in exchange for a deposit to her Cayman 
Islands bank account, she surely should be convicted of bribery. Moreover, 
an agreement to provide unspecified benefits need not be express. A corrupt 
agreement sometimes can be inferred simply from the regular flow of 
                                                 
85 Id. at 350 (emphasis in the original).  
86 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998). 
87 Id. at 1014. 
88 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007). 
89 Id. at 147. 
90 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
91 Id. at 268 (emphasis added). 
92 526 U.S. 398 (1999).  
93 Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added). See also McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 
273 (1991) (declaring that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when an 
official has made an “explicit promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not perform an 
official act”).  
94 In addition to the court of appeals decisions cited above, see United States v. Abbey, 
560 F.3d 513, 519-22 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th 
Cir. 1997); and United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1186-91 (11th Cir. 2010).  
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benefits in both directions.95   
The principal danger of the “stream of benefits” concept of bribery is 
nearly the opposite of the one defendants have suggested. It is not that 
prosecutors and juries may fail to identify precisely the action a public 
official agreed to perform. It is that they may fail to identify any benefit an 
official accepted in exchange for a promise of official action. Although the 
“stream of benefits” metaphor can be compatible with the quid pro quo 
requirement, it invites slippage from this requirement to a “one hand washes 
the other” or “favoritism” standard. 
Every definition of bribery looks to the moment a benefit is received. 
Bribery can be committed before this moment—the crime includes offers 
and solicitations—but it cannot be committed after. A payment cannot 
become a bribe retrospectively—not even when its recipient later acts to 
benefit its donor, not even when the recipient is motivated in whole or in 
part by gratitude to the donor, and not even when the recipient hopes to 
encourage further favors. As Justice Stevens wrote in a dissenting opinion, 
“When the petitioner took the money, he was either guilty or not guilty.”96 
Words and actions that follow the receipt of a benefit may supply evidence 
of what the donor and recipient intended when it was received, but they 
cannot transform a benefit that was lawful at that moment into a bribe. 
Some bribery statutes proscribe giving or accepting benefits with intent 
to influence. Others proscribe giving or accepting benefits as 
“consideration” for official acts. Under either definition, favoritism 
following the receipt of a benefit is not bribery; cronyism is not bribery; 
“steering” contracts is not bribery; and “one hand washes the other” is not 
bribery. These things are not good government. They are corrupt in the 
classic Aristotelian sense of the word. They sometimes may be the result of 
bribery and sometimes may evidence bribery. But they are not bribery. If an 
official were subject to imprisonment whenever a jury could be persuaded 
that he had acted deliberately to benefit someone who once did a favor for 
him, only a fool would take the job. The circumstances must warrant an 
inference that, at the time the official accepted one or more of the benefits 
in the stream, he agreed at least implicitly to provide something in return. 
The dangers of the watery metaphor are illustrated by a case I lost, that 
of former Illinois governor George H. Ryan. The jury in Ryan’s case was 
directed to convict him if he failed to disclose a conflict of interest, but after 
the Supreme Court held in Skilling that failing to disclose a conflict of 
                                                 
95 A very clear illustration is United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984), 
described in note supra.  
96 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also Evans v. United 
States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (“The offense is complete at the time when the public 
official receives a payment in return for his engagement to perform specific official acts.”). 
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interest was no crime, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the jury must have 
convicted him of taking bribes. The court focused particularly on the award 
of a government contract to a lobbying client of co-defendant Lawrence 
Warner. Warner was a political associate and family friend who had done 
favors for Ryan and members of his family. The court quoted and approved 
the district court’s conclusion that Ryan’s reason for approving the contract 
must have been either to promote effective law enforcement, as he claimed, 
or else  
 
to compensate Warner for the stream of benefits he provided, as 
the Government urged. The jury rejected the good faith motive.[97] 
Accordingly, the jury could only have convicted him on this count 
if it believed his conduct was a response to the stream of benefits. 
. . . The court concludes that the jury must have found Ryan 
accepted gifts from Warner with the intent to influence his 
actions.98 
 
The court spoke of “compensate[ing] Warner for the stream of benefits” 
and of “accept[ing] gifts from Warner with the intent to influence [Ryan’s] 
actions” as though they were the same thing. But the gifts obviously came 
at an earlier point than the “compensation.” These gifts might have been 
unconditional and legitimate even if they inspired gratitude and did prompt 
later “compensation.” By equating subsequent favoritism for a benefactor 
with bribery, the court concluded that the jury must have found bribery. Its 
analysis placed every public official at risk.  
 
IV. WHY DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY SHOULD REMAIN UNDER-INCLUSIVE 
 
For once, the Supreme Court has the law just right: “[F]or bribery, there 
must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something in 
exchange for an official act,”99 and campaign contributions may be treated 
                                                 
97 Under the instructions, the jury could have found a lack of good faith simply 
because Ryan failed to disclose a conflict of interest, and it might have found non-
disclosure of a conflict even if Ryan’s only reason for approving the contract was to 
promote effective law enforcement. For present purposes, disregard that difficulty and 
assume that the jury did reject Ryan’s claim that his only reason for approving the contract 
was to advance the public good. Imagine that Ryan acted in whole or in part to benefit his 
friend Warner and that the jury so found.  
98 Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ryan v. United 
States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 645 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011), 
vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012)).  
99 Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States, 526 U.S 398, 404-05 (emphasis in the 
original). 
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as bribes only when “the payments are made in return for an explicit 
promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not to perform an official act.”100 
In a concurring opinion one year after McCormick required an “explicit” 
quid pro quo for campaign contributions alleged to be bribes, Justice 
Kennedy objected to the Court’s requirement: “The official and the payor 
need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s 
effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”101 As the reference 
to winks and nods suggests, it grates that McCormick places a premium on 
indirection. The Supreme Court has made achieving the functional 
equivalent of bribery so easy that one may wonder why anyone ever resorts 
to the real thing. The only thing that can be said for the Supreme Court’s 
“explicit” quid pro quo requirement is that the alternative would be worse. 
Whenever an elected official adheres to the positions that prompted 
contributors to support him, he exhibits a pattern of favoritism for these 
contributors. This pattern may bespeak conviction, not corruption. 
Ambitious prosecutors and cynical jurors, however, can easily infer a 
corrupt agreement from the common pattern. When an official has 
supported widget subsidies after accepting large contributions from widget 
manufacturers, for example, prosecutors and jurors may infer that there 
must have been an implicit understanding. Allowing inferences of this sort 
whenever officials have acted to benefit contributors could make public life 
intolerable. One state has gone beyond McCormick by declaring that a 
properly reported campaign contribution may not be treated as a bribe at 
all.102 A narrow definition of bribery like McCormick’s reduces the 
likelihood of “inferences” based on cynicism. 
As a special prerogative of their position, law school teachers are 
allowed to pose hypothetical cases that never could happen. I therefore 
invite you imagine that the great philosopher Aristotle, resurrected from the 
dead, is elected governor of New Jersey. 
Unlike anyone who has actually been governor of New Jersey, Aristotle 
gives no thought to his own welfare of that of his family, friends, and 
supporters. He believes that “governments which rule with a view to the 
private interest . . . are perversions.”103 Aristotle is incorruptible, and his 
focus on the public good never falters.   
 But of course the inevitable happens. Many of Aristotle’s decisions 
benefit people who have supported him politically, and others benefit 
                                                 
100 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991). 
101 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
102 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 162.005, 162.015 (2011). Cf. Texas Penal Code § 36.02(a)(4) 
(requiring “direct evidence of [an] express agreement” to “take or withhold a specific 
exercise of official discretion” before a campaign contribution may be treated as a bribe).  
103 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 59 (Benjamin Jowett, tr.) (Forgotten Books ed. 2007).   
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people who have done favors for him and members of his family. And when 
the inevitable happens, critics point to Aristotle and say, “Aha! Behold! One 
hand washes the other. We always knew that guy was no different from the 
rest of them.”  
The United States Attorney ultimately charges Aristotle with bribery, 
extortion, honest services fraud, and racketeering. He says that Aristotle 
accepted benefits that he must have known were intended to influence him 
and, further, that he must have intended to be influenced. The prosecutor 
adds that Aristotle failed to disclose the conflicts of interest created by 
many of the benefits he received. He invites jurors to infer that there must 
have been an unspoken understanding that Aristotle would reciprocate in 
some unspecified way for the favors he received.  
The jurors, many of whom entered the jury box with the conviction that 
most politicians are corrupt,104 are astonished by the number of charges. 
They convict on every count. The trial judge then lectures Aristotle on how 
serious a wrong it is to betray the public trust. He sentences Aristotle to five 
years, less than the 20 years proposed by the prosecutor.  
Defense attorneys and public officials who have been convicted of 
misconduct typically maintain that federal prosecutors can convict anyone 
they like.105 The complaint sounds like an alibi, but broad definitions of 
bribery bring it close to the truth. Whenever the law of bribery is not under-
inclusive, it is over-inclusive. There is no Goldilocks position. Indeed, the 
law of bribery may be radically under-inclusive and radically over-inclusive 
at the same time. It may leave many functional equivalents of bribery 
untouched while sending Aristotle to prison. That’s the corruption dilemma. 
 
V. EX ANTE REGULATIONS AND WHY THEY MUST BE UNDER-INCLUSIVE TOO 
 
Zephyr Teachout writes, “Once corruption is understood as a 
description of an emotional orientation, rather than a description of 
contract-like exchange, the idea of criminalizing it seems either comical or 
fascist.”106 Speaking of the kinds of rules commonly found in ethical codes 
and campaign finance regulations, she observes, “The emotional nature of 
corruption makes it better suited for bright-line rules that are unconcerned 
with intent.”107  
                                                 
104 See text at notes infra. 
105 See JAMES L. MERRINER, THE MAN WHO EMPTIED DEATH ROW: GOVERNOR 
GEORGE RYAN AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME xi (2008) (quoting convicted former Member 
of Congress Dan Rostenkowski); HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW 
THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009).    
106 TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 285.  
107 Id. at 286. The rules to which Teachout refers are not entirely unconcerned with 
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Teachout makes sense. It is only fair to tell officials and their 
benefactors what they may and may not do before they act. Rather than 
allow jurors to infer that Croesus, a wealthy industrialist, must have 
intended to influence Solon, a state legislator, when he entertained Solon at 
his ranch and gave him a $25,000 campaign contribution, the law should 
tell Croesus and Solon in advance whether an industrialist may entertain a 
legislator and make a $25,000 contribution. When corrupting benefits take 
the form of campaign contributions, however, the Supreme Court has 
largely blocked the most appropriate form of regulation, making expansion 
of the bribery net more likely.108  
Although Teachout’s position is sound and sensible, anyone who 
attempts to draft a code of ethics for public officials will soon learn that this 
code cannot block all functional equivalents of bribery. The range of 
corrupting practices is wide—soliciting and accepting gifts, accepting 
invitations to social events, accepting invitations to professional 
conferences, accepting honoraria for speeches, accepting royalties for 
publications, accepting referral fees, accepting investment advice, 
participating in privately funded fact-finding missions, creating or lending 
support to charities, owning stock and other passive investments, engaging 
in remunerative employment or private business ventures, negotiating for 
future private employment, accepting post-government employment, and 
more. 
Drawing appropriate lines is challenging. Should Croesus entertain 
Solon less lavishly than his other friends, refusing to invite him to the ranch 
but meeting him later at Denny’s? Must Solon, having accepted a public 
trust, remain cloistered like the members of an ascetic religious order, 
refusing to accept hospitality worth more than $50 even from old friends? 
Would it be better just to require Solon to report as a gift any entertainment 
                                                                                                                            
intent. The intent they sometimes require, however, is simply an intent to cross the bright 
lines they set forth. No speculation about deeper motivation is required.  
108 For criticism of the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize that campaign 
contributions are hybrids of protected speech and unprotected gifts to candidates and that 
they differ greatly from other funds used to bring speech to audiences, see Albert W. 
Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and 
SpeechNow, FLA. L. REV. (2015). The campaign finance restrictions the Supreme Court 
held invalid in Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010), were in fact models of appropriate regulation. For the most part, they provided 
specific, comprehensible rules, permitted people potentially affected by these rules to 
obtain clarification through advisory opinions, were enforced primarily through civil 
sanctions, and imposed criminal penalties only for willful violations. See Federal Election 
Commission, Quick Answers to Compliance Questions, 
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_compliance.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2012); Federal 
Election Commission, Advisory Opinions, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ao.shtml 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
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he receives worth more than $50?109 
If Solon serves part-time as most do state legislators do,110 who may 
patronize his law firm, insurance brokerage, or real estate agency? Who 
may give his spouse, adult child, or niece a job? Who may contribute to his 
favorite charity—or his spouse’s favorite charity?111  
Wherever the lines are drawn, people seeking favor are likely go beyond 
                                                 
109 Mandating disclosure is the regulation of easiest resort. As Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Carl E. Schneider observe, “[T]he intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive 
alone.” Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2011). This regulatory technique addresses a problem (or makes a 
show of it) without notably affecting the public treasury. People burdened by the new 
regulations often do not protest lest they be thought to have something to hide. More 
information (and more and more) is thought to facilitate wiser decisions, although no one is 
likely to read it. Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude, “Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei, 
luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure.” Id. at 181. 
To be sure, the utility of disclosure varies from one situation to the next. When 
opponents, the press, and watchdog groups review the mandated disclosures of political 
candidates and elected officials, they discover things the public should know. The 
disclosures of candidates and elected officials often do not convey useful information, 
however, see LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 251-60, and the disclosures of less 
prominent public employees are likely to remain unread on the Internet and in file drawers.  
Compliance with reporting requirements is also likely to be burdensome. Abner 
Mikva, a former Member of Congress, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, former 
White House counsel, and recent recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, declared, 
“[W]e already require the filing of too many forms. Every year all of our senior officials 
spend countless hours filling out countless disclosure forms. . . . The reports are so 
complicated that most reviewers can’t understand what they are reviewing, but they do 
serve as wonderful traps to snare the unwary official.” Abner J. Mikva, From Politics to 
Paranoia: Misguided Ethics Laws Have Given Us More Mistrust, Not Less, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 26, 1995, at C2. Mikva observed, “[G]overnment cannot daily prove its rectitude to 
the cynic convinced of government’s corruption.” Id. 
110 See MARGARET ROBERTSON FERGUSON, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 191 (2006) (noting that the work of a state 
legislator is a full-time job in only 11 states). 
111 In Louisiana, Supriya Jindal created the Supriya Jindal Foundation for Louisiana’s 
Children shortly after her husband, Bobby Jindal, became the state’s governor. The Jindal 
Foundation provides high-tech equipment to schools, and Mrs. Jindal travels throughout 
the state to deliver this equipment personally. One early contributor to the foundation was 
AT&T, which gave $250,000. At about the same time, AT&T sought the governor’s 
approval of an arrangement for providing television cable services. Marathon Oil, which 
also gave $250,000, sought an increase in the amount of oil it could refine at its facility in 
Louisiana. The governor’s press secretary said of the foundation, “It is a completely 
nonpolitical, nonpartisan organization created by the first lady, who as an engineer and the 
mother of three children, has a passion for helping our young people learn science and 
math. Anything other than this reality has plainly been dreamed up by partisan hacks living 
in a fantasy land.” See Eric Lipton, Charity Offers Corporate Tie to a Governor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, at A1. See also Raymond Hernandez & David W. Chen, Keeping 
Lawmakers Happy Through Gifts to Pet Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1. 
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them. The authors of an ethical code may determine that the code should 
not require the spouses, parents, children, nieces, nephews, and political 
associates of public officials to refuse customary gifts and social invitations 
or to decline ordinary business opportunities. This judgment, however, will 
create an opening for favor-seekers. When people who may be interested in 
doing business with the state send silver to family weddings and flowers to 
family funerals, critics may howl about loopholes and functional 
equivalents.112     
The effect of ex ante regulation often may be to substitute weaker for 
stronger conflicts of interest. In fact, giving a job to an officeholder’s 
favorite nephew is usually not the functional equivalent of promising post-
government employment to the officeholder himself. Although regulations 
have hydraulic effects, one should not assume that they can neither reduce 
the amount of money devoted to buying influence nor increase the cost of 
buying it.113  
The impossibility of suppressing all functional equivalents of bribery 
though either corrupt-intent bribery laws or ex ante regulations may lead 
one to say with Rutherford B. Hayes, “Law is no substitute for 
character.”114 Hayes’s observation is noble and spot-on, but it may not be of 
great comfort in a world in which all of us have been banished from the 
Garden.  
 
VI. FROM STEVENSON TO BLAGOJEVICH: HAS THE EFFORT TO CLEAN UP 
GOVERNMENT THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MADE THINGS BETTER? 
 
Over the past 60 years, Congress has given prosecutors an ever-larger 
arsenal of tools for fighting corruption.115 Although the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
112 The difficulty of drawing appropriate lines ex ante pushes regulators toward 
employing fuzzy mental-state standards ex post. They may declare it permissible for 
Croesus to entertain Solon at the ranch if Solon is in fact an old friend but impermissible if 
Croesus is trying to influence Solon’s performance of his official duties. 
113 But cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) ("[W]e think political money, like 
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air."); McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always find an outlet”).  
114 Letter from Rutherford B. Hayes to Colonel G. Bickham (Dec. 5, 1888), in 4 DIARY 
AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES 426 (Charles R. Williams, ed., 1922).    
115 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act, enacted in 1961); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, enacted in 1970); 18 
U.S.C. § 666 (the federal program bribery statute, enacted in 1984); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the 
Money Laundering Control Act, enacted in 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (the honest services 
statute, enacted in 1988); Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002) (part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (increasing the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud from 5 to 
20 years). Although members of Congress speak of giving “tools” to prosecutors, they 
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reined in the lower federal courts as best it can, these courts have construed 
anti-corruption measures expansively. Corruption trials have become 
longer. Every large United States Attorney’s Office has established a Public 
Corruption Unit, and experienced prosecutors have competed for 
assignments to this unit. In addition, the Justice Department has created a 
Public Integrity Section staffed by “about 30 prosecutors who travel the 
country to help local United States attorney’s offices develop complex and 
often politically contentious corruption cases.”116 In 1976, federal 
prosecutors indicted 337 officials for corruption, a five-fold increase from 
the number six years earlier.117 The number of officials prosecuted annually 
by the federal government today is about 800.118  
Perhaps the federal effort to lock up public officials has given America 
better and less corrupt government, but if it has, the public has not noticed. 
The percentage of Americans who believe that “quite a few” government 
officials are “crooked” has doubled in 50 years (from 24% in 1958 to 51% 
in 2008),119 and the percentage of people who believe they can trust the 
federal government most of the time has dropped by more than two-thirds 
in 30 years (from 70% in 1980 to 22% in 2010).120 Forty-seven percent of 
the public say that most members of Congress are corrupt (slightly more 
than say that most are not corrupt).121 An impressionistic glance toward 
                                                                                                                            
seem never to speak of giving “tools” to defense attorneys.  
116 Charlie Savage, Another High-Profile Failure for a Justice Dept. Watchdog, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A17.   
117 See Charles F. C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in 
the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1172 (1977) (citing U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Feb. 26, 1977, at 36).  
118 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2012 at 24 & 25-26 Table 12, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2012-Annual-Report.pdf; TRACREPORTS, 
OFFICIAL CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS DECLINE UNDER OBAMA, 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/358/ (undated) (reporting somewhat lower figures than 
those supplied by the Justice Department); Daniel H. Lowenstein, When is a Campaign 
Contribution a Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127, 129 Tbl. 6.1 (William C. 
Heffernan and John Lowenstein eds. 2004). The high-water mark came in 1991 when the 
federal government prosecuted almost 1200 officials. Id.   
119 See LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 167 (citing New Judicial 
Watch/Zogby Poll: “81.7% of Americans Say Political Corruption Played a ‘Major Role’ 
in Financial Crisis”, JUDICIAL WATCH, Oct. 21, 2008). 
120 Id. (citing THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: 
DISTRUST, DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR (April 18, 2010), available at 
http://people-press.org/http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf, and JEFFREY 
BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-RAISING’S INFLUENCE ON 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 10 (2000)). 
121 Joseph Carroll, Americans Increasingly View Most Members of Congress as 
Corrupt, Gallup News Service, May 17, 2006, available at 
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today’s public officials may also suggest that the effort to improve 
government by locking up officials has misfired. My home state, Illinois, 
has gone within my memory from Governor Adlai Stevenson to Governor 
Rod Blagojevich. 
The Stevenson-to-Blagojevich observation may provoke your own 
impressionistic assessment, but I confess that it is a rhetorical ploy. Most 
public officials were not as virtuous as Adlai Stevenson 60 years ago, and 
few are as lacking in character as Rod Blagojevich today.  
In 1948, the year Stevenson was elected governor, the election of a 
Democratic majority in the Illinois House made Representative Paul Powell 
a leading candidate to become Speaker of the House. Powell famously 
remarked on election night, “I can smell the meat a’cookin.”122 Powell did 
become Speaker and later Secretary of State, and when he died in 1970, 
people found $800,000 in cash in shoeboxes, briefcases, and strongboxes in 
his Springfield hotel suite. They also found 49 cases of whiskey, 14 
transistor radios, and two cases of creamed corn. Although Powell’s salary 
never exceeded $30,000 per year, he left an estate worth $4.1 million. One 
million dollars of it consisted of racetrack stock.123   
Your speculation about whether federal corruption prosecutions have 
made things better or worse is as good as mine. My own guess, however, is 
“both.” My sense is that officials like Powell have become less common 
than they were 60 years ago, and so have officials like Stevenson. Federal 
corruption prosecutions may have played a part in both stories. 
Although the F.B.I. found $90,000 in cash in Congressman William 
Jefferson’s freezer in 2005,124 corruption prosecutions today rarely involve 
shoeboxes stuffed with cash or offshore bank accounts. The officials who 
wind up in prison are likely to be figures like Alabama Governor Don 
Siegelman, accused of agreeing to appoint someone to a state board in 
exchange for financial support of a program to generate education funds,125 
and Robert Sorich, a Chicago mayoral aide accused of patronage hiring in 
violation of a civil consent decree.126 The public’s greater mistrust of public 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.gallup.com/poll/22837/americans-increasingly-view-most-members-congress-
corrupt.aspx. See also INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, SURVEY OF YOUNG 
AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE (23d edition 2013), 
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/spring_poll_13_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
122 See MERRIMER, supra note , at 17.  
123 See Paul Powell (politician), WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Powell_(politician) (last visited Jan. 8, 2015). 
124 See Jerry Markon, Jefferson Gets 13 Years in Bribe Case: Former Congressman 
Renowned for $90,000 F.B.I. Found in Freezer, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2009, at A2. 
125 See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011). 
126 See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); Sorich v. United States, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86213 (N.D. Ill. 2011).   
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officials may reflect changed standards or simply a more resentful mood 
rather than either the officials’ changed behavior or the public’s changed 
perception of what they do.127   
If shoeboxes full of cash are indeed rarer today, perhaps the reason is 
that public officials and their corruptors now have more class. They may 
have learned that campaign contributions and other “functional 
equivalents,” even if not “equivalent,” are plenty good enough. Cash bribes 
may have become infrequent not only because they are criminal but also 
because they are unnecessary. I am inclined to believe, however, that 
deterrence through criminal punishment has played a part.128  
Deterring bribery is an excellent idea, but deterring Adlai Stevenson 
from running for office is not. Federal corruption prosecutions might have 
made twenty-first century Stevensons less likely to enter politics for two 
reasons.   
First, these prosecutions reflect and reinforce the dark view of 
politicians voiced by economists, taxi drivers, and radio talk-show callers. 
When office-holders are presumed corrupt, many virtuous people may find 
the game not worth playing. Daniel Patrick Moynihan commented, 
“[P]olitics, business, and war have ever been the affairs of adventurers and 
risk takers,”129 and Moynihan’s observation may be especially true today. 
The adventurers still attracted to the game may be more likely than today’s 
Adlai Stevensons to cut corners. Criminal prosecutions probably have 
contributed to rather than ameliorated the public’s sense that most 
politicians are “crooked.” 
Second, corruption prosecutions reinforce the sense that running for 
office means entering a world of sharpened knives. Although a twenty-first 
century Stevenson might not be concerned that seeking office could land 
him in the cell next to Aristotle’s, he could not avoid noticing that to enter 
                                                 
127 Few public officials banish altogether from their thoughts and actions the impulse 
to aid friends and supporters and to encourage further support. Unfortunate though their 
favoritism may be, even the best officials are likely to give friends and supporters a leg up.  
This conduct once did not spark moral indignation. When cronyism went too far and 
appeared to compromise the public interest, political opponents might complain; people 
might call for more civil service reform or competitive bidding; and voters might fail to 
reelect an official. But no one seemed to demand long prison terms. 
128 When I wrote an article about the prosecution of former Illinois governor George 
Ryan, my goal was to criticize the overreach of Congress, federal prosecutors, and the 
courts, not to advance the cause of effective law enforcement. See Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Mail Fraud & Rico Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 
113 (2006). Someone told me, however, that the Speaker of the Illinois House had 
circulated copies of my article to his staff along with a note asking them to notice how easy 
it is to get in trouble. If the story is true, it illustrates deterrence in action.  
129 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, When the Irish Ran New York, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 
1993 (available at http://www.city-journal.org/article02.php?aid=1499).  
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politics is to enter a jungle. Candidates today must not only be wary of the 
knives of others but also consider how sharp a knife to wield themselves. A 
present day Stevenson might well conclude that, if he wants to be 
successful, he cannot remain Adlai Stevenson. Although journalists, 
political consultants, and politicians have done more than prosecutors to 
make politics a game of gotcha, prosecutors have played a part.130  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Government corruption stirs resentment. It unites almost everyone, 
including members of both the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party 
movements. When public officials and their benefactors can engage in 
                                                 
130 The Justice Department censured U.S. Attorney Thomas DiBiagio after a 
newspaper learned of memoranda he had sent his staff. DiBiagio told his subordinates that 
he wanted three “front page” white collar or public corruption indictments by November 6, 
a date close to election day. See Editorial, A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST, July 20, 
2004, at A16, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63069-
2004Jul19.html. In view of the incentives of the U.S. Attorney’s office, one commentator 
expressed surprise that anyone was surprised. See George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: 
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials after Sabri, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 403, 403 
(2005). 
When a Justice Department task force examined the removal of nine United States 
Attorneys during the administration of President George W. Bush, it found evidence that 
some had been encouraged to file prosecutions for political reasons. In what was probably 
the most egregious case, the task force documented a stream of phone calls and other 
communications from Republican office holders and party officials to David Iglesias, the 
United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico. The communications encouraged 
faster and more vigorous prosecution of Democrats in two corruption cases and a voting 
fraud case.   
A call late in the series came on October 26, 2006, shortly before the elections of that 
year. In an apparent reference to one of the corruption cases, U.S. Senator Pete Domenici 
asked whether he could expect an indictment before November. Iglesias answered that he 
did not think so. Domenici said, “Well, I’m very sorry to hear that,” and hung up. 
On Election Day, November 7, Domenici’s Chief of Staff wrote in an email to the 
President’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor Karl Rove, “We worry still about the 
USA here.” At a White House meeting one week later, Heather Wilson, a Republican 
Member of Congress, remarked to Rove that “the U.S. Attorney in New Mexico is a waste 
of breath.” Rove replied, “That decision has already been made. He’s gone.”  
On December 7, a deputy White House counsel informed Senator Domenici’s office 
that Iglesias would be asked to resign. The counsel then emailed a Justice Department 
official that “Domenici’s COS [Chief of Staff] is happy as a clam.” Another Justice 
Department official requested Iglesias’s resignation the same day. See U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 190-
200 (2008). 
Even when prosecutors are not partisan and are not subject to outside pressure, they 
are likely to view a state’s governor in the same way a big game hunter views a cape 
buffalo. 
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practices that resemble bribery and escape punishment, people get angry. 
Nearly everyone appears to favor broader anti-corruption laws. They may 
assume that the only reason these laws don’t exist already is that lawmakers 
are corrupt and want to stay that way.  
This article has argued, however, that broader anti-corruption laws 
generally make things worse. It has traced the history of two competing 
concepts of bribery—the “intent to influence” concept and the “illegal 
contract” concept—and it has taken the language of various definitions of 
bribery more seriously than this language often has been taken.  
“Intent to influence” may be an appropriate standard when applied to 
benefits given to appointed judges (both in the seventeenth century and 
today), but it is a preposterous standard when applied in the twenty-first 
century to people who must collect donations to run for office and who are 
appropriately subject to persuasion in a wide variety of social settings 
bearing little resemblance to a courtroom. The “illegal contract” concept is 
more appropriate.  
Although the Supreme Court’s refusal to treat campaign contributions as 
bribes in the absence of an “explicit” quid pro quo is easily criticized 
(“That’s not how it’s done!”), inviting inferences of criminal behavior 
whenever the actions of elected officials have benefitted donors to their 
campaigns would be worse. The Supreme Court has appropriately rebuffed 
efforts to use a statute criminalizing deprivations of “the intangible right of 
honest services” to scuttle the quid pro quo requirement. Moreover, 
although the currently fashionable “stream of benefits” metaphor can be 
compatible with the “illegal contract” concept of bribery, courts should not 
allow talk of streams, retainers, meal plans, and open bars to degenerate into 
a “one hand washes the other” or “favoritism” standard. 
Broad definitions of bribery not only sweep into their net common and 
widely accepted behavior. They also invite unjustified inferences and 
empower prosecutors to pick their targets. Most people, however, toot only 
one horn of the corruption dilemma.     
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